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ABSTRACT Current host-centric Internet Protocol (IP) networks are facing unprecedented challenges,
such as network attacks and the exhaustion of IP addresses. Motivated by emerging demands for security,
mobility, and distributed networking, many research projects have been initiated to design the future Internet
from a clean slate. In order to obtain a thorough knowledge of security in future Internet architecture,
we review a number of well-known projects, including named data networking, Content Aware Searching
Retrieval and sTreaming, MobilityFirst Future Internet Architecture Project (MobilityFirst), eXpressive
Internet Architecture, and scalability, control, and isolation on next-generation network. These projects aim
to move away from the traditional host-centric networks and replace them with content-centric, mobility-
centric, or service-centric networks. However, different principles and designs also raise various issues on
network security. For each project, we describe its architecture design and how it deals with security issues.
Furthermore, we compare these projects and discuss their pros and cons. Open security issues are pointed
out for directing future research.
INDEX TERMS NDN, COAST, MobilityFirst, XIA, SCION, future internet, security.
I. INTRODUCTION
The current Internet designed 40 years ago has evolved from
an academic network to a widely used commercial network.
It has been deeply involved in our daily life and become an
indispensable part of our society.
Internet began with packet switching for military
requirement [1]. As the Internet evolved, Transmission Con-
trol Protocol/Internet Protocol (TCP/IP) was adopted in 1980.
The IP as a principal communication protocol in Internet
Protocol Suite (IPS) has the task of delivering packets from a
source host to a destination host solely based on IP addresses.
To realize data transmission, the IP defines its format of
packets that includes a header and a payload. The IP header
is tagged with the source and destination IP addresses that
identify hosts and provide a logical location service. Internet
Protocol Version 4 (IPv4) [2] is the first publicly used version
of the IP and is still the dominant protocol of the current
networks. But the 32-bit address applied in IPv4 restricts
address space, which makes it hard to identify various hosts
with the fast growth of the Internet and to support future
development. In order to solve this problem, Internet Protocol
Version 6 (IPv6) [3], which is intended to replace IPv4 [4], is
designed with 128-bit address yielding 3.4× 1038 addresses
and specifies a new packet form. General worldwide deploy-
ment of IPv6 is increasing. For example, the percentage of top
level domains with IPv6 name servers has achieved 97.9% [5]
and the percentage of users that access Google over IPv6 has
increased to 12% [6].
Although the IP protocol achieves great success and is
widely used, it still triggers many challenges to the net-
work. First, a host-centric IP network does not conform to
highly distributed communications. The sustained growth in
e-commerce, digital media and social networking has led to
the dominant use of the Internet as a distributed network.
However, each packet transmitted over the Internet with a
host-centric design principal needs information about its des-
tination and its source (i.e., IP), which limits the development
of distributed networks. Second, the Internet connects billions
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of nodes and even more in the future, which will mostly
suffer from the exhaustion of IP addresses, especially IPv4
addresses [7]. Third, the current Internet is absent of security
design in its original architecture and is hindered by more and
more sophisticated network attacks. Though IPv6 extends
the address space and offers globally unique IP addresses
to enhance security (e.g., authentication), it still faces many
other security issues [8], [9], such as flooding issues and
mobility issues. Some new protocols (e.g., IPSec [10] and
DNSSec [11]) have been designed to complement the existing
protocols, but they still have security weakness (e.g., clogging
system) [12]. However, the involved entities nowadays pay
much attention to security, scalability, and mobility and so
on in social life, especially economic activities. Security is
expected to be embedded in the network design as an inherent
feature. Fourth, it is difficult to add new functionalities and
new usage models into the current Internet architecture to
satisfy its increasing new demands. Because current methods
for incremental deployment always involve tunnels or over-
lays, which easily hide the new functionality from the existing
network. For example, if some entities are intended to support
content-centric networking with a tunnel, then the traffic that
ends up being tunneled through the network using IPv4would
still need source and destination addresses. The features
of content-centric network cannot be fully presented. The
emergence of new needs makes its original functionalities
(e.g., storage, transmission, etc.) under pressure [13], while
most of patches are temporal solutions and increase the com-
plexity of architectures [14]. In general, the inconsistency
between the Internet design and real usage demands urgently
calls for a clean-slate Internet architecture.
There have been significant research efforts on the topic of
Future Internet Architecture (FIA), which aims to overcome
the above challenges, and security has become an indis-
pensable part and been taken into consideration seriously
in these architecture designs. These efforts are widely made
all over the world, e.g., in the Unites States and the Euro-
pean Union (EU). However, security as a complex problem
brings many challenges, which are difficult to be covered
by any single project. In this paper, we survey five famous
projects of FIAs, which are based on various principles.
Different from some existing surveys [15]–[17], our work
focuses on the security requirements and potential counter-
measures, which play a baseline of future security work in this
area.
Information-Centric Networking (ICN) has emerged
as a promising candidate for FIA design. The NDN
project [18]–[20] as a derivative ICN work was funded
by the U.S. National Science Foundation (NSF) under its
FIA Program [21]. This new Internet architecture moves
from typical host-centric to content-centric one and focuses
on what- the content rather than where- the addresses and
hosts, which further develops the Content-Centric Network-
ing (CCN) architecture [22]. It adopts the hourglass architec-
ture derived from the success and lesson of today’s Internet,
and proposes to cache the content in routers, which can reduce
network traffic. However, it also introduces new issues, espe-
cially efficient signature and trust management problem.
Another content-centric network, COAST [23], [24] was
within the European Research Program 7 [25] and partially
funded by the European Commission. It builds an overlay
architecture, which aims to find desired data in the closest
networking devices and forward it to a data consumer as fast
as possible. In contrast to the NDN, the COAST implements
intelligent routers and nodes in an overlay network, which can
monitor and filter traffic flows and verify transmitted contents
in the network in order to enhance security.
As the name indicates, MobilityFirst [26]–[29] was
designed with mobility as a crucial top-level design goal,
which was also conducted as part of the FIA program
under NSF. The MobilityFirst adopts a massive Global Name
Resolution Service (GNRS) to dynamically bind names and
addresses to achieve mobility and enhance security.
Yet another NSF project, XIA [30]–[32] designed a clean-
slate network architecture to achieve several goals: trust-
worthiness, long-term evolution of usage models, long-term
technology evolution and explicit interfaces between network
actors. Besides the content principal in the NDN and the
COAST and the host principal in current networks, the
XIA also supports many other principals (e.g., networks and
services including transport protocols and mobility services)
and even new ones emerging in the future.
Finally, SCION [33]–[35] was designed with the ability to
provide route control, failure isolation and explicit trust infor-
mation for end-to-end communications. It adopts the notions
of Isolation Domains (ISDs), Autonomous Systems (ASes)
and Trust Root Configuration (TRC) to deal with routing and
trust management. The SCION can achieve high availability
even in the presence of distributed adversaries and resist some
existing popular attacks. Patch Construction Beacons (PCBs)
were introduced to discover and establish routing paths.
Contributions of this paper can be summarized as
below:
• We provide a thorough overview of the above five
projects, including their principles and special features,
especially security concerns and countermeasures.
• We present the pros and cons of each project, and
compare the five projects in terms of security
properties.
• We further discuss the security issues that should be
taken into consideration in the design of future Internet
architecture.
• We propose some open issues to guide the future
research.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. The NDN
is presented in Section 2, followed by the COAST that is
reviewed in Section 3. Section 4 discusses the MobilityFirst.
Then the XIA and the SCION are presented in Section 5
and Section 6 respectively. The pros and cons of the five
projects and their comparison are given in Section 7, followed
by further discussions on future research issues in Section 8.
Finally, a conclusion is presented in the last section.
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II. NAMED DATA NETWORKING (NDN)
The current Internet Protocol (IP) was designed to create
communications between a source and a destination that are
identified by IP addresses. However, it is not applicable to
highly distributed networks. What users really care about is
what they get rather thanwhere it is from. Therefore, theNDN
project [18]–[20] was proposed to overcome the weakness of
the Internet’s current communication architecture and accom-
modate emerging patterns of communications, which shifts
its point from where- the host to what- the content. Simi-
lar to current IP architecture, the NDN has its own narrow
waist design. But it uses data names instead of IP addresses
for delivery, which removes the restriction of the length of
IP addresses and enables scalable communications.
In this section, we give a brief description of its architecture
and introduce the solutions proposed by the NDN to fulfill its
specified security requirements.
A. NDN ARCHITECTURE
The NDN is a new architecture, grounded in current prac-
tice. Some basic architectural principles are described as
follows:
• Hourglass Architecture: The NDN remains the
hourglass-shaped architecture of IP architecture, but
makes some revisions. Specially, it replaces IP packets
with content chunks.
• Security: Decoupling data from how or where it is
obtained and signing all Data packets provide effective
ways to ensure data trust [36]. The signature also guar-
antees data integrity and enables verification on data
provenance.
• End-to-End Principle: The NDN keeps this princi-
ple because of its good performance to enable devel-
opment of robust applications in the face of network
failures.
• Self-Regulating Network Traffic: Tomake the Internet
stable, the NDN incorporates traffic-flow-balance.
• Routing and Forwarding Plane Separation: the NDN
adopts this principle to allow its deployment with the
best available forwarding technology while carrying out
new routing system research in parallel.
In the NDN, the receiving endpoint, i.e., a data consumer,
drives communications. Two kinds of packets are transmitted
through the Internet: Interest and Data. A consumer sends
an Interest packet indicating its desired data with a name
to the network, and then routers forward the Interest packet
towards any producers (i.e., data sources). If the Interest
packet reaches a node that has the desired data, the node
then returns a Data packet containing both the same name as
specified in the Interest packet and the required content. The
Data packet needs to be signed to enhance security. This Data
packet follows in reverse the path to get back to the requesting
consumer.
In the following subsection, we present the details of each
element in the NDN architecture.
1) NAMES AND ADDRESSES
Names in the NDN play the same role as the target and
source addresses in IP, which guide the forwarding and
routing of the Interest packets and Data packets. Owing
to the opaqueness of names, a router can organize the
boundaries between components in names without knowing
the meaning of the name. For example, a video produced
by Singapore Management University (SMU) may have the
name /smu/videos/demo.mpg, where ‘/’ delineates the name
components similar to URLs. The NDN names are opaque
to the network [18], [19] and are designed in hierarchical
structure.
To dynamically retrieve desired data, data consumers
must be able to deterministically construct the
name of their desired data before they get to know their
contents. Two methods can be applied: (1) A determin-
istic algorithm can arrive at the same name based on
the information available to both data producer and con-
sumer; (2) Retrieve the desired data through one or more
iterations depending on the Interest selectors and longest
prefix matching [37], [38]. The data reachable glob-
ally must have globally unique names, but those names
for local communications can be based on local context
because it only requires local routing to search for desired
data.
Namespace management is not regarded as a part of the
NDN architecture, hence the concrete design of names is not
considered, especially the opaqueness. However, naming is
the most important part of the architecture which is the basis
of all other functionalities (e.g., data acquisition and data dis-
tribution), and its structure is highly related to security [39].
Efficient management of names is of great significance in the
development of the NDN, especially the opaqueness design
of names.
2) CACHING
Independent of who requests or from where it is retrieved,
the NDN Data packet can be cached in the router’s Con-
tent Store (CS) opportunistically. Once receiving an Interest
packet, the router first checks if the desired data has been
stored in its CS. If yes, the Data packet can be sent back
directly to the data consumer. Thus, the data consumer may
obtain the desired data even before the Interest packet reaches
the data producer(s). The caching exhibits the superiority over
IP in data delivery, multicast and even retransmission after a
packet loss.
The NDN tries to enhance privacy by only specifying
the name of desired data. This works differently from the
traditional Internet, where one can find out what is in the
packet and who is requesting the data by checking the header
or payload of a packet in the IP network. But the caching
of Data packets in routers also incurs many privacy issues
that retard the deployment of the NDN, which are discussed
in Section 2.2.
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3) ROUTING AND FORWARDING
The NDN routes and forwards packets based on names rather
than addresses, which eliminates some serious problems
in the IP architecture: 1) the exhaustion of address space;
2) Network Address Translation (NAT) traversal problem;
3) address assignment and management problem.
To forward the Interest and Data packets successfully,
each NDN router maintains three data structures: a Pending
Interest Table (PIT) for storing all the Interests that a router
has received but not satisfied yet, a Forwarding Information
Base (FIB) for making informed decision about how to deal
with the Interest packet flexibly, and a Content Store (CS) for
opportunistically storing Data packets.
When an Interest packet carrying a data name arrives, the
router needs to check its own data structures to complete
forwarding process as following:
a) It first checks if the required data has been cached in
the CS. If yes, the Data packet can be sent back directly.
Otherwise, step to b).
b) It further looks up this name in its PIT entry. If a
matching Interest record exists in the PIT (that is, the
router has forwarded the Interest packet), it simply adds
the incoming interface to the PIT entry and waits for
the Data packet. The router only needs to forward the
first Interest packet if it receives the same Interest pack-
ets more than once from different nodes. Otherwise,
step to c).
c) The forwarding strategy module together with
FIB information makes the informed decision about
how to deal with the Interest packet flexibly. Then the
router completes its forwarding process according to
the decision. For example, if the upstream link is down
or extremely congested, the router can send a Negative
Acknowledgement (NACK) to its downstream neigh-
bors, which may trigger other router to explore other
routes to forward the Interest. It can finally mitigate
congestion and resist potential DoS attacks.
When the Data packet arrives, the forwarding procedure is
much simpler. The router first looks up the Interest packet
with the same name in its PIT entry. If no record exits,
it directly discards the Data packet; Otherwise, it forwards
the Data packet as a response, then removes the record
from the PIT. If a timeout occurs, the Interest record will
also be removed from the PIT. In addition, the Data packet
can be cached opportunistically in the CS for a period
of time, which leads to an efficient network without the
need for any notion of source or destination nodes in data
delivery.
Additionally, applying the PIT in theNDNdesign has some
other advantages:
1) The PIT enables multicast data deliveries according to
its Interest record. When the Data packet arrives, the
router can multicast it to related interfaces stored in
the PIT.
2) The self-control of the number of pending Interests
results in a flow balance. Each Interest retrieves at most
one Data packet, but a router needs to forward the Data
packet to all requesters. If a router is overloaded, it can
autonomously choose to slow down or stop pending
Interest packets in the PIT.
3) The control on the number of PIT entries can constrain
the effect of a DDoS attack. If a router receives the
same Interest packet it has forwarded, it has no need
to forward it again. Meanwhile it controls the number
of Interests for different Data packets, which also con-
trols traffic loads. Thus it constrains the influence of
DDoS attacks on the network.
4) The timeout record of the PIT entry can help detect
attacks. If an Interest packet is kept in the PIT overtime
and the router does not receive its corresponding Data
packet, then the router can mark the source of the
Interest packet as a suspicious attacker. Especially, if
one timeout Interest packet is always transmitted over
the network, it is probably a DoS attack.
B. SECURITY IN NDN
The NDN architecture takes the security into consideration
during the design and aims to resist some popular types of
Internet attacks. However, it also poses some new problems.
In this section, we will focus on security issues that the
NDN solves and triggers.
1) DoS & DDoS AND COUNTERMEASURES IN NDN
Denial-of-Service (DoS) and Distributed Denial-of-
Service (DDoS) threaten the Internet in recent years. The
adversary in DDoS exploits a huge number of compromised
machines or zombies to attack a specific target. The DDoS
attack is easy to execute and difficult to be mitigated. There-
fore, it is crucial to limit or even eliminate the effects of the
DDoS attack.
In the NDN architecture, the Data packet is only delivered
upon a request and the Interests for same data are merged into
one Interest packet. Moreover, the number of PIT entries and
the timeout record can be used to analyze and detect attack
behaviors. This pull-model can effectively eliminate some
existing DDoS attacks.
However, two new types of NDN-specific DoS attacks
towards the new architecture were identified by Gasti [40]:
interest flooding and content/cache poisoning.
a: INTEREST FLOODING
As the router needs to store Interest packets in the PIT, it is
possible for an adversary to send a huge number of Interest
packets to flood a particular data producer or overflow the
PITs, which leads to the failure of handling legitimate Interest
packages. The requested contents by adversaries can be
classified into three types: existing static contents,
dynamically-generated contents and non-existent contents.
Correspondingly, the Interest flooding attack towards each
type of content has different effects:
• Existing static content: NDN has a built-in
countermeasure that caches the Data packet.
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Therefore, NDN routers do not forward subsequent
Interest packets for the same existing content.
• Dynamically-generated content: In this case, all Interest
packets are routed to data producer(s), thus they con-
sume network bandwidth and the PIT of routers, thus
inducing intrusions.
• Non-existent content: The router can immediately
remove an invalid request, but this attack can still affect
the PIT by occupying its storage space as they will be
stored until they expire.
Regarding to these attacks, Gasti et al. proposed two
potential countermeasures:
• Router Statistic: NDN routers keep track of the expired
Interest packets and set a threshold to the pending Inter-
est packets. They limit: the number of pending Interest
packets per interface; the number of Interest packets per
interface; and the number of pending Interest packets per
namespace.
• Push-back Mechanisms: The goal of push-back mecha-
nism is to isolate attack source. Once a router suspects an
on-going attack from one interface, it will report to the
routers close to the interface. Iteratively, these routers
will send the reports towards the offending interface
where the suspicious attack comes from and finally push
back to its source.
Compagno et al. [41] further pointed out the weakness of
these countermeasures and further proposed to mitigate the
attacks in an initiative way from the perspective of detection
and reaction.
b: CONTENT/CACHE POISONING
The adversary targets data contents and causes the router to
forward and cache corrupted data. Generally, it compromises
the NDN routers. When the Interest packet arrives, the com-
promised router will return the poisoned Data packets.
To counteract this type of attack, the involved parties
apply self-certifying Interest and Content or Collaborative
verification techniques. The countermeasure can verify the
association between a name and a corresponding content, and
the validity of the content. An alternative is to utilize smart
forwarding to mitigate the caching poisoning attack [42].
If receiving a bad Data packet, an Interest packet that contains
an indication to exclude the poisoned content can be sent to
notify its upstream router.
2) DATA SECURITY AND PRIVACY ISSUES IN NDN
Signing Data packets not only guarantees data integrity, but
also realizes a certain level of trust. It allows the consumers
to reason whether a data producer is acceptable for pro-
viding particular data in a specific context. However, trust
between consumers and producers could be dynamically
changed, which makes it hard to adopt a ‘‘one fits all’’ trust
model. Hence, the NDN should figure out a set of usable
trust mechanisms for a wide application range, which needs
further experiments and investigation. An example of trust
management is described in [43]. All the potential advantages
of the NDN rely on an efficient digital signature system and
effective trust management. But key revocation and manage-
ment are still open and crucial issues.
In addition, the NDN is innate privacy-friendly due to lack
of source and destination in terms of their network addresses.
But it still prompts some privacy concerns stemming from
the semantic richness of names and data privacy besides the
problem above. The names used for retrieving contents are
semantically related to the contents themselves. An attacker
could infer sensitive information about a user, by monitoring
its requests. Thus, content name opaqueness becomes a very
urgent research issue. Bloom filter [44], [45] may be a pos-
sible technique to deal with this problem. Moreover, digital
signatures of Data packets need to be publicly verifiable;
hence the identity of a content signer may be easily inferred
by looking at the signature. DiBenedetto et al. [46] proposed
to enhance the privacy with anonymity. It introduces a pair
of distinct anonymizing routers to realize the routing with
encrypted Interest packet.
As described in Section 2.1, the cache of Data packet
exhibits great superiority in data delivery. Once the desired
data has been stored, the data consumer can obtain it in
almost optimal speed with lowest network traffic. Owing
to the names of data, the retrieve of content fragment is
much easier than that in the current network with caching
on the routers [47]. Caching in the NDN helps reduce con-
gestion, improve delivery speed, and optimize bandwidth
consumption. But this feature also reflects some potential
issues of damaging the privacy of data consumers and pro-
ducers [48], [49]. One of the most serious problems is data
confidentiality. Data packets cached at routers are available to
anyone that requires for them, which is exposed to data leak-
age. Many cryptographic techniques (e.g., symmetric encryp-
tion, broadcast encryption, Proxy Re-Encryption (PRE), etc.)
and access control mechanisms [50], [51] can be potentially
used to protect the data. But they incur many other problems,
such as disabling caching mechanism, and extra computation
and communication overhead. The NDN still seriously lacks
a practical scheme to guarantee data security. Beside content
confidentiality, responses at routers with caching could also
intrude user privacy. For example, one consumer forwards
its Interest packet for one specific data. If he/she obtains the
data very fast, then he/she can be sure that someone nearby
has received the same data. Thus, it obliviously exposes
some information to subsequent consumers, which may be
unacceptable in some sensitive scenarios. In order to protect
the privacy of data consumers, Acs et al. [48] proposed some
methods to overcome this weakness. As not all contents are
private, then it is possible to specify which content is sensi-
tive. The data producer, the consumer or both of them can
drive it. Some techniques were proposed to provide certain
tradeoffs between privacy and latency and inhibit adversaries
from extracting meaningful information from the traffic via
router caches. Chaabane et al. [49] pointed out the privacy
problems about caches, contents, names and signatures exist-
ing in the content-centric networking. They also proposed
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several countermeasures to overcome the flaws caused by
monitoring or censorship, such as waiting before replying,
encrypting data, bloom filters, and group signatures, etc.
In general, data security and privacy preservation are vital
in the development and employment of the NDN architecture
in the future.
III. CONTENT AWARE SEARCHING RETRIEVAL
AND STREAM (COAST)
The COAST project [24] is a Specific Targeted Research
Projects (STREP) project within the European Research Pro-
gram 7 and partially funded by the European Commission.
It also aims to build a content-centric network architecture to
intelligently and efficiently link billions of content sources to
billions of content consumers, and offer fast content-aware
retrieval, delivery and streaming.
In the COAST, the data consumers only need to specify
their desired data and then the COAST framework can search
and return the data to the consumers efficiently, realizing the
Service Level Agreements (SLAs) in content consumption.
A. COAST ARCHITECTURE
Similar to the NDN, the COAST project designed a content-
centric architecture, which aims to improve the content dis-
covery and delivery. As mentioned above, current Internet
content delivery as the vast majority of Internet usage is based
on the IP addresses of the source and the destination. Usually,
search engines crawl over the Internet to find, classify and
index contents or services for potential use. Once a data
consumer queries a search engine, it will get a number of
URLs related to the desired content. Finally, the consumer
selects a URL to access the data.
However, the data access procedure is inconsistent with
real usage. For example, two data consumers close to each
other require for a famous video from YouTube. The video
will be streamed a few dozens of times per square blocks to
the two consumers respectively. The same data must have
been flowed through the same routers twice to reach the
neighbor consumers. But in real usage, the data can be trans-
mitted through the longest common path before bifurcat-
ing the same message to the two neighbor consumers. The
COAST aims to eliminate the inconsistency above and adapt
to the real usage. The same data do not need to be flowed
multiple times through almost the same paths in the COAST.
The COAST is a multi-layer network and consists of vari-
ous virtual hierarchies of nodes with different functionality.
An example design of three layers [24] is presented as
follows:
1) THE LOWER LAYER - NETWORK PROVIDER
INFRASTRUCTURE OVERLAY
This layer is the infrastructure of Internet Service
Provider (ISP) and network providers, which also includes
some nodes with limited functionality and intelligence. Users
are considered as Content Producers and Consumers, and
content is routed via this layer.
2) THE MEDIUM LAYER - DISTRIBUTED CONTENT/
SERVICES AWARE OVERLAY
Content-Aware Network Nodes (e.g., edge routers, home
gateways and terminal devices) in this layer have the intelli-
gence to filter the content and service flowing through them,
identify streaming sessions and traffic, and finally provide
qualification for the legitimate content. The qualification
will be reported to the higher layer of hierarchy. Additional
functionalities can be added by constructing virtual overlays
at this layer. The nodes can operate as hybrid client-server
and/or P2P networks, according to delivery requirements.
3) THE HIGHEST LAYER - INFORMATION OVERLAY
This layer consists of intelligent nodes or services that
have a distributed knowledge of content/web-service loca-
tion/caching and network instantiation/conditions. This layer
makes decisions on the way to optimally retrieve and dis-
tribute data to consumers or inquiring users or services,
which is based on its awareness of the content/services loca-
tion/caching over the network and related network informa-
tion. The content may be stored/cached at the Information
Overlay or at the lower hierarchy layers.
a: DISTRIBUTED CONTENT AND SERVICE SEARCHING
To achieve better performance, the COAST aimed to design
solutions for crawling, indexing and query processing that
can take the full advantage of multiple distributed sites
(including nodes, sites, and data centers). The COAST
presents two ways to perform crawling:
• Active Crawling: Crawlers fetch documents from the
Internet, index their information, and follow links in this
fetch.
• Passive Crawling: The search engine receives indexable
information out of Deep-Packet Inspection (DPI) per-
formed by the COAST intelligent nodes in the medium
layer. Intelligent nodes scrape data, cache them and send
interesting contents and new services to the Information
Overlay.
However, an efficient discovery mechanism needs to be
designed and verified.
b: CACHING
Like the NDN, the COAST also adopts content cache to
increase network efficiency and lower data delivery delay.
But it caches data contents, query results and parts of indexes.
And it caches these data not only at the highest layer, but also
at the intelligent nodes of the medium layer. The intelligent
nodes of the highest layer also cache contents, while the
search engine maintains information about the caches copies.
It can guide the data consumers to the closest cached copies
with the cooperation of intelligent nodes and the search
engine.
c: CONTENT-AWARE DELIVERY
To achieve a smooth delivery of media contents, the medium
layer collects and exploits the information available in the
COAST to organize, optimize and deliver the contents.
VOLUME 4, 2016 4379
W. Ding et al.: Survey on Future Internet Security Architectures
Content-aware delivery is enabled by four key factors as
described below.
• Distributed media identification: The COAST
performs distributed media storage through content
indexing/caching services to define a distribution policy
and optimally route content distribution.
• Content-aware probing: The COAST optimizes and
performs actual content delivery processes. The better
awareness of the content it obtains, the better delivery
policy it defines. Therefore, it firstly needs to define
a set of metrics, a simple model to estimate the PQoS
(Perceived Quality of Service) and estimate the perfor-
mance of the overlay at a global level, thereby estimating
the available delivery policies for new sessions.
• Matching content and network: The types of contents,
their current availability and locations, their characteris-
tics and even the features of the content representations
will be taken into consideration.
• Content-aware streaming: The streaming process will be
based on bandwidth-efficient and low-delay strategies to
improve delivery performance. In P2P, every peer node
should know the relationships between its peers and the
segments of desired data to fetch the desired segments
correctly.
B. SECURITY IN COAST NETWORKS
Both the NDN and the COAST are content-centric rather than
host-centric, but they differ in security. All packets including
Interest packets and Data packets are verified and filtered in
the COAST while only the Data packets are verified in the
NDN. As a content-centric architecture, the COAST avoids
some attacks towards the host-centric IP networks, but it is
exposed to some new attacks.
1) DoS AND DDoS IN COAST NETWORKS
Similar to the NDN, the COAST also applies the cache to
gain better performance in data delivery. As a result, it may be
exposed to COAST-specific DoS/DDoS attacks besides the
traditional DoS/DDoS attacks.
Fortunately, the COAST incorporates basic defenses
in its design. The network nodes in the Distributes
Content/Services Aware Overlay have intelligence to filter
contents and Web services, and offer qualification for legiti-
mate contents. With the capability to add virtual overlays at
this layer, the COAST would be able to monitor and detect
abnormal streaming. Moreover, the intelligent nodes at the
Information Overlay have knowledge of content caching and
network instantiation. The intelligence at the two layers can
ensure the validity of a data flow and eliminate the caching
of contents generated by adversaries. The DoS/DDoS attacks
can only dissipate the bandwidth and nodes’ time to filter the
flow.
2) HOST-OBLIVIOUS NETWORK SECURITY (HONS)
The current network security relies on the operations of
network, thus its security systems depend on the
host-centric architecture. As pointed out in [52], the content-
centric networks cannot apply host-dependent network
security schemes. Therefore, a new paradigm named Host-
Oblivious Network Security (HONS) was proposed.
The HONS adopts the q-composite Rand Pool-
Based (q-RPB) scheme for host-oblivious and mutually inde-
pendent multiple secure associations [53]. It dynamically
changes security association to resist the weakness of a
host-based key under key exposure. A Key Distribution
Center (KDC) manages a Key Pool (KP). The KDC as a
trusted entity shares a symmetric key with each node and
is responsible for issuing a Key Ring (KR) for each node.
Each key in the KR has its index, which is used for building
a session key. When a node requests for data, it forwards
an Interest packet, a hashed MAC and a set of index of
q-number of keys, etc., the responder validates the infor-
mation with the same key index. Hence, the responder
can generates the session key with the requesting node
K = hash({ki}q), where ki is indicated by the key index and
q is decided by the security-sensitivity of content. Moreover,
neither the data requester nor the data responder has any idea
about each other except the host-oblivious keys.
The HONS can achieve confidentiality, integrity, authenti-
cation, and source and destination anonymity. But the HONS
has a low probability of successfully establishing the session
key between a data consumer and a data producer. As stated
above, the HONS is applicable to the NDN and the COAST
because both of them are content-centric.
IV. MobilityFirst FUTURE INTERNET ARCHITECTURE
PROJECT (MobilityFirst)
The MobilityFirst project [26]–[29] was started in 2010
funded by the FIA program under NSF. It is a specific
realization of the emerging class of ICN [54]. As the name
indicates, the MobilityFirst project was intended to address
the problem of mobility. The mobile devices outnumber the
tethered Internet hosts. But the current Internet with hardly
changed architecture and hosts cannot accommodate to the
rapidly increasing number of mobile devices, which drives
the design of the MobilityFirst. Furthermore, it was designed
with trustworthiness as a goal in mind.
As one of the most important and outstanding designs,
a massively scalable name service was adopted to separate
the names and network address. Additionally, the Globally
Unique Identifier (GUID) was defined to enhance security.
A. MobilityFirst ARCHITECTURE
The current Internet architecture cannot satisfy the demand
of network users. There exist a few problems: (1) the Internet
cannot resume the download when device moves; (2) the
current network is fragile in mobile and wireless network;
(3) additional infrastructure is needed to support seam-
less mobility. In order to address the challenges above, the
MobilityFirst designs several key components:
• Decentralized Name Certification Service (NCS):
The NCS securely binds human-readable name to
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a GUID. The GUID is a cryptographically verifiable
identifier, which can improve the trustworthiness and
allow seamless mobility. It can be used as a public key
to provide a mechanism for authentication and trust
management for attached devices or objects. TheMobil-
ityFirst can also support context-based descriptor by
mapping the context to a particular GUID.
• Global Name Resolution Service (GNRS): GNRS is a
central component and responsible for supporting seam-
less mobility. It securely maps the GUID to a Network
Address (NA) if the GUID has been assigned to an
object. The cooperation of the NCS and the GNRS can
bind a readable name to a network address, which is the
base of communications.
• Computing and Storage Layer: As an imperative
requirement, evolvability is achieved by supporting a
computing and storage layer, which can enable rapid
introduction of new and possibly niche services without
impacting remaining traffic and fast forwarding paths.
1) NAMES AND ADDRESSES
The MobilityFirst separates human-readable names, GUID
and network locations. The GUID can be assigned to not
only devices but also contents. A content GUID differs a
little bit from an interface or device GUID. The self-certifying
content GUID is a one-way hash value of the content itself,
which allows any entity to check its integrity. Additionally,
the GNRS would not save a state for all content GUIDs,
which helps reduce the overhead of a GNRS provider. The
routable content address will be encoded as a two-tuple of
content GUID and producer GUID denoted as [CID, PID].
Then, the data consumers who know the tuple can request for
desired data.
The destination GUID is attached to a Packet Data
Unit (PDU). Another service identifier in the packet header is
used to indicate the type of service, such as unicast, multicast,
anycast, context delivery, etc. The first router will resolve the
destination GUID and obtain dynamical mapping from the
GNRS. The resolved NAs are optionally chosen to guide data
forward. A self-certifying GUID can be easily implemented
by computing a one-way hash of a public key. And it can
be authenticated through a bilateral challenge-response pro-
tocol.
To establish a communication with an endpoint GUID,
a sender first queries the GNRS about the corresponding NA
of GUID and then sends its packets to the destination. Thus,
the sender and the receiver can construct their communication
based on NAs.
2) CACHING
Similarly, in the NDN and the COAST, the MobilityFirst also
takes the advantage of caching to improve network perfor-
mance. It exploits in-network storage at routers to temporarily
store Protocol Data Unit (PDU) that can cope with varia-
tions in wireless access network bandwidth and occasional
disconnections. Furthermore, a generalized storage-aware
routing (GSTAR) protocol [55] can integrate Delay Tolerant
Networking (DTN) capabilities to provide a seamless solu-
tion. The storage-aware routing can also be used together
with block transport to enhance network performance and
disruption-tolerance.
3) SCALABLE MOBILITY AND CONTENT-AWARE DELIVERY
Though the GUIDs are fixed, the endpoints are possible to
frequently change their network points and result in differ-
ent NAs. Generally, endpoint mobility falls into four possible
cases according to the time an endpoint moves:
1) Pre-lookup mobility suffices if the endpoints rarely
change their network addresses.
2) Connect-time mobility is regarding the scenario that a
destination moves before a connection is established
but the initiator has queried. The initiator simply re-
launches a three-way handshake when its first request
timeouts.
3) Individual mobility refers to one endpoint moving after
a connection has been established. The moved end-
point can directly re-synchronize the communication
by sending a message to its peer with its new NA.
4) Simultaneous mobility happens when the other end-
point moves in individual mobility but the connec-
tion of the endpoints has not been re-synchronized.
The endpoints should restart the whole constructing
process.
Besides the endpoint mobility as described above, the
GNRS also enables network mobility wherein a whole net-
work moves across locations. This feature would be very suit-
able for ad hoc infrastructure-less communications between
mobile devices (e.g., vehicle or body-area networks).
To achieve high scalability, a hybrid name/address is
adopted in the MobilityFirst. As the number of forwarding
table entries in a core router should be commensurate to the
total number of NAs, the Internet routing protocol is designed
to support a hierarchy architecture to trade off packet header
space against forwarding table size. The core network router
only keeps the forwarding entries for other core networks and
a few ‘‘consumer’’ edge networks; while the edge network
router keeps forwarding entries only for a few ‘‘producer’’
core networks and edge networks nearby.
Moreover, theMobilityFirst can support content-aware and
context-aware services based on multicast. Multicast as an
instance of context-aware delivery can be achieved easily.
First, a multicast GUID (MID) is introduced. The GNRS
maintains the membership set of each MID consisting of
all GUIDs belongs to the multicast group. Each member
GUID i in MID subscribes to the group via a single home
NA. The name service resolves a MID by collecting and
returning the union of all NAs (NAi, i = 1, . . . ,N ) that have
the members subscribing to the MID. A sender would send
the data addressed to [MID,NAi] for all NAs respectively.
Finally, NAi resolves the MID to the subset of GUIDs and
forwards the data to each member depending on an intra-
network routing protocol. Content-aware delivery is similar
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to multicast, which sends data to groups based on attribute-
based descriptors. For example, to enable a geo-casting, each
potential member should maintain its geolocation attribute.
The GNRS creates a context-awareMID to describe the spec-
ified geolocation. The sender delivers its data to the members
matching this MID, which is similar to the procedure of
multicast as described above.
The MobilityFirst also involves the dual-homing service
that a device can have two or more wireless interfaces which
is hard to handle in the IP protocol. For example, a user’s
laptop may have two or more wireless interfaces (such as
WiFi and 3G) on separate access networks, and the service
objective is to deliver to at least one of these interfaces based
on a suitable cost metric. The PDU carries these network
addresses. A network routing protocol implements a longest
common path type of algorithm before bifurcating a same
message to both interfaces. The dual-homing service can eas-
ily solve the disconnection over a network edge and provide
seamless mobility.
In general, the MobilityFirst provides good mobility and
scalable routing services, which enhances its performance in
various application scenarios.
B. SECURITY IN MobilityFirst NETWORKS
1) SECURITY ROOTED IN MobilityFirst
Different from the hierarchical names in the NDN, theMobil-
ityFirst adopts a globally unique identifier to name devices,
interfaces and even contents. The unique identifier can be
securely bound to its corresponding entity, which lays the
foundation of security and privacy for this project design.
The GNRS is responsible for a massive replication and fed-
eration of name certification as well as the name resolution.
Therefore, it is vulnerable to DDoS attacks if the adversary
tries to exhaust the resource of GNRS. Fortunately, the prop-
erty of self-certifying GUID ensures that the GUID through
the network is verifiable. And the GNRS can collaborate with
access control list to fortify security and privacy. The in-
network content storage and retrieval at routers ensure that the
static content is resistant to flash floods. The block transport
combined with storage-aware routing results in better perfor-
mance to tolerate disruption and realize seamless mobility.
Moreover, theMobilityFirst dynamically binds names with
network addresses, which can be anonymous to some extent.
Packet forwarding can be constructed in two steps: first by
an internetwork routing protocol and then by an intranetwork
one. The internetwork routing protocol can be oblivious of
the GUID, while the intranetwork one is accomplished with
GUID. Hence, only the NA is exposed to the internetwork,
which is not fixed and boundwith oneGUID. This functional-
ity can preserve privacy for consumers and producers, which
satisfies the users’ requirement for privacy and enhance user
acceptance.
2) NetFence: PREVENTING DENIAL OF SERVICE
Besides security embedded in the MobilityFirst, Liu,
Yang and Xia proposed NetFence [56] that presents a scalable
DoS-resistant network architecture applicable for the Mobili-
tyFirst. They designed solutions to suppress attack traffic and
resist DoS attacks from the perspective of networks rather
than end systems. Each NetFence router holds three channels:
request channel with no more than 5% link capacity, regular
channel, and legacy channel with low priority.
The NetFence can be used in the MobilityFirst to detect
and suppress the DoS attacks to further enhance its security.
The NetFence combines prioritization and priority-based rate
limitation to ensure the successful transmission of a request
by a legitimate sender. The router uses the combination of
link load and packet loss rate to indicate a potential attack.
Once an attack is detected, a monitoring cycle is started until
the attack is ended. At the same time, congestion policing
feedback is stamped into the NetFence header of all passing
packets, which is policed by an access router. Innocent DoS
victims can use the unforgeable congestion policing feedback
as a capability token to suppress a bulk of unwanted feedback.
Hence, the traffic of DoS damage can be separated from legal
traffic.
V. EXPRESSIVE INTERNET ARCHITECTURE (XIA)
As presented above, the NDN and the Coast are content-
centric and the MobilityFirst is mobility-centric. Different
from these three projects, the XIA [30]–[32] is an Internet
architecture project designed with the native support for mul-
tiple principals (e.g., hosts, contents, services and networks)
and the ability to evolve its functionality to accommodate new
principals over time. It is designed with the following goals:
be trustworthy, support long-term evolution of usage models,
support long-term technology evolution and support explicit
interfaces between network actors. This section illustrates the
XIA architecture and its security.
A. XIA ARCHITECTURE
The XIA maintains some features of IP protocol, but also
introduces several new principles in order to achieve its
design goals as described below:
• Communications between Diverse Principals: It sup-
ports the communications between diverse entities, such
as hosts, services, contents and additional principals
motivated by future usage models. The different con-
tracts for each principal type enable different commu-
nication styles, which can address the evolvability goal
of supporting the current and future usage models.
• Intrinsic Security: The self-certifying identifiers for all
principal types enable principal-specific security. This
mechanism allows users to validate an intended coun-
terpart, and check its integrity and accountability.
• Flexible Addressing: Flexible addressing supports fall-
back addressing, which enables a router to deliver a
packet even if the router does not support all of destina-
tion information that maybe include a newly-introduced
principal type. The flexible addressing together with
communications between diverse principals can directly
support evolvability. It supports client mobility at
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the cost of additional indirection through a rebinding
mechanism [57].
1) NAMES AND ADDRESSES
As presented above, the XIA supports different principals.
The initial XIA defines four basic XIA identifiers (XIDs) as
following:
• Host XID (HID): HID is the hash of a host’s public key
that can be used to validate with whom a principal is
interacting. Similar to IP, it can also be used for the
purpose of unicasting.
• Service XID (SID): SID deals with the communications
with services and realizes anycast, which allows clients
to verify the identity of a service. The SID defines what
entities do. Note that the SID is different from the service
identifier in the MobilityFirst.
• Content XID (CID): CID is defined as the hash of a con-
tent, which allows clients to retrieve a desired content
from anywhere and check its correctness.
• Network XID (NID): NID specifies a network (i.e.,
autonomous domain) and allows clients to validate the
intended network, with which it is communicating.
The XIA introduces Directed Acyclic Graphs (DAGs) to
represent the addresses of XIDs to achieve flexible address-
ing. The DAGs are highly flexible by allowing packets to
express fallbacks and scoping to realize user intent. An exam-
ple routing technique is given in Fig.1. A ‘‘dummy’’ source
‘‘•’’ represents the conceptual source of a packet and the
target is as a sink. Scoping means that the packet must be first
routed to a scoping XID before being sent to the destination
even if it has the direct route. For example in Fig.1(b), outers
deliver the packet to NID first and then forward the packet to
an intended SID. Another example of fallback is presented
in Fig.1(c). If the SID is not available or recognized, the
router will use the fallback NID through a fallback edge
(dotted line). Finally, the combined mechanism of scoping
and fallback in the DAG is presented in Fig.1(d). Each router
along the fallback path can route directly to the intended node.
FIGURE 1. Examples of address DAGs.
2) CACHING
Owing to the supporting CID, the XIA enables the oppor-
tunistic caching of contents for future services. Similar to
the caching in the NDN, routers can also cache the data
packets they receive opportunistically. Thus, data consumers
can require contents by directly expressing their requests
with the CID and retrieve data from either a data producer
or content caches of routers. This mechanism can improve
the efficiency of data retrieve and save bandwidth. Similar
to the caching in the NDN, the CIDs as the cryptographic
hash of contents, hold a self-certifying feature and enable
any network entities to verify whether the retrieved content
matches the identity of the content.
FIGURE 2. XIA forwarding engine of a router.
3) XIA FORWARDING AND ROUTING
The XIA achieves flexible addressing by adopting DAG.
An XIA router forwards data packets following the pro-
cedure shown in Fig.2. The edge represents the flow of
packets. With the development of the XIA, more ele-
ments of unknown principals could be added in the dotted
boxes. For example, a sourcing content CIDs provided by
server HIDs in autonomous domain NIDs would have the
DAG: · → NIDs → HIDs → CIDs and a content desti-
nation in other domain may have a destination DAG: · →
NIDd → HIDd → CIDd . First, the packet is passed to a
CID processing module by a source classifier based on the
XID type of the sink node of the source DAG. Then the router
checks the XID of the outbound edges of the last-visited node
of the DAG in a priority order. The packet is forwarded along
adjacency if the router supports the principal type; If it is not
recognized, the packet is returned to the classifier that can
check other outbound edges or fallback lines; the destination
is unreachable if no outgoing edges work. The forwarding
process described above is iteratively executed until it reaches
destination CIDd .
B. SECURITY IN XIA NETWORKS
1) INTRINSIC SECURITY
The XIA intrinsically provides secure identifiers. The XID as
the hash of public key is associated with a public-private key
pair. As stated above, the identifier can be used for checking
the integrity of content, validating a counterpart that a prin-
cipal is communicating with, and ensuring that the content
is as expected. Thus, it improves the trustworthiness of end-
to-end communications, service access, and content retrieval.
Additionally, the XID provides a level of accountability and
integrity.
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2) PRIVACY
With the rapid development of data mining, privacy has
become one of the most important factors to evaluate a new
architecture. Fortunately, the XIA research considered the
issue of privacy.
As the XIA supports multiple types of identifiers, a device
can optionally choose XIDs according to their own use. For
example, the device can use one XID for email and another
for web search. It is difficult to determine that a same user is
involved in multiple activities, which reduces the possibility
of tracking.
VI. SCALABILITY, CONTROL, AND ISOLATION ON
NEXT GENERATION NETWORK (SCION)
Many patches have been created to fix the vulnerabilities
of the current networks due to its lack of security. But it
has led to unexpected consequences or the requirement of
trust root. Therefore, the SCION [33]–[35], an inter-domain
network architecture, was designed to provide route control,
failure isolation, and explicit trust information for end-to-
end communications. The SCION has the following special
features:
• Availability in Presence of Adversaries: The architec-
ture is able to circumvent malicious cases such as on-
path adversary drops, delays packets, and injects packets
into networks, etc.
• Transparency and Control over Forwarding Paths:
Transparent network path enhances the privacy
and security of communications, and path control
improves the availability and defends against network
attacks by allowing data receivers to select incoming
paths.
• Efficient Trust Management: The verification of enti-
ties is always based on the trust of roots. But it is difficult
to enumerate the trust roots as intermediate Certification
Authorities (CAs) are always implicitly trusted. Hence,
the control over trust root can enable users to easily
choose or exclude trust roots regarding to their own
willingness. All involved entities globally cannot agree
on a single trust root in current PKI models, while a
plethora of roots may result in a weakest link of security.
Therefore, the SCION designs a global but heteroge-
neous trust, which is not taken into consideration in other
four projects.
• Efficiency, Scalability, and Extensibility: Security
and high availability usually are achieved at the
expense of efficiency and scalability. However, high
performance and scalability are of great signi-
ficance in daily usage, especially economic
activities.
• Foundation for Other Architectures: P2P communi-
cation is the key target due to its advantages in dis-
tributed communications.
In what follows, we primarily introduce the archi-
tecture of the SCION, and its security issues and
countermeasures.
A. SCION ARCHITECTURE
The SCION organizes existing Autonomous Systems (ASes)
into groups of independent routing sub-planes called Isola-
tion Domains (ISDs), which are fundamental building blocks
in the SCION. Fig.3 gives an example of SCION with three
ISDs. Each ISD has one or more ASes acting as an ISD core,
and one or more regular ASes. The ISD core negotiates a
policy named Trust Root Configuration (TRC) to dominate
the ISD, which is described in details in Section 6.1.3.
In general, an associated globally-unique human-readable
name space is given to each ISD. ASes join an ISD by
purchasing a service from one AS in the ISD. The arrow of a
link in Fig.3 indicates a provider-customer relationship. All
ASes in the ISD should agree on the trust roots and ISD
policies operated by some entities. An AS may belong to
several ISDs. The use of ISD can provide transparency and
support heterogeneous trust environments. In what follows,
we present the details of the SCION architecture.
FIGURE 3. Three SCION ISDs with ISD Cores and ASes. The ISD Core ASes
are connected via Core links. Non-core ASes are connected via
customer-to-provider or peering links.
1) CONTROL PLANE: BEACONING FOR ROUTE DISCOVERY
The SCION supports two levels of routing, named intra-ISD
and inter-ISD, which discover routing paths by announcing
and distributing Path Construction Beacons (PCBs) within an
ISD or among ISD Core ASes. The inter-domain PCB trans-
mission process helps the Core ASes obtain the paths to every
other Core AS; while the intra-domain PCB dissemination
helps ASes learn the paths to reach the ISD Core ASes.
Fig.4 shows the main components of control plane for
discovering paths. As shown in Fig.4(b), each AS consists
of three kinds of servers: Beacon Servers for discovering
path information by disseminating PCBs, Path Servers for
maintaining path segments and disseminating path informa-
tion, and Certificate Servers for managing key materials and
certificates to secure the intra-AS communications. In route
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FIGURE 4. (a) SCION ISD with path construction. (b) Magnified view of AS
D1 in (a) with servers and routers.
discovery, the intra-ISD PCBs in a Core AS will be dissem-
inated to all non-Core ASes in the ISD. Upon receiving the
PCBs, the non-Core AS beacon servers resend them to their
customer ASes. And each AS adds its interfaces into the
PCB. Hence, the PCBs are propagated from the ISD Core to
customer ASes, for example, the intra-ISD PCBs transmitted
through the path J→A2→A1→A in Fig.4(a). The beacon-
ing process in inter-ISD communications is similar to the
route advertising process of Border Gateway Protocol (BGP),
except that the process is periodic. After PCB transmission,
ASes can choose sets of path segments and upload them to
path servers. If a beacon server wants to validate the authen-
ticity of PCBs, it queries a certificate server that keeps the
cached copies of TRCs and ASes’ certificates.
The SCION end-to-end communication is supported by
up to k path segments. Up-segment represents the path seg-
ment leads towards an ISD Core; down-segment represents
the path segment from the ISD Core to an AS. If a source
host wants to communicate with a destination host, it first
sends a path resolution request to its local path server that is
responsible for forwarding the request to a core path server.
The core path server checks if the destination host is within
the same ISD as the source host. If yes, the core path server
can directly respond the local path server with up to k path
segments. Otherwise, the core path server first obtains the
corresponding down-segments from a core path server of the
destination host. In both cases, the local server returns up
to k path segments to the source host. If needed, a core-
segment connecting the cores of two ISDs is also provided
to the source host.
A SCION path is constructed using the following
techniques:
• Immediate path segment combination: If the destina-
tion and the source have the same core AS in their
path segment, the connection of the up-segment and
the down-segment results in a valid end-to-end path.
AS B and AS D in Fig.4(a) have the same core AS I,
thus their communication path forms as B→B1→BC→
I→D1→D.
• AS shortcut: The up-segment and the down-segment
intersect at a normal non-Core AS. Then a short path
can be obtained by omitting the intersection of the two
segments. Though AS B and AS C in Fig.4(a) have the
same core AS I, they meet at AS BC and their packets
could not be transmitted to coreAS I and their path forms
an AS shortcut: B→B1→BC→C1→C.
• Peering shortcut: There is a peering link to connect
the up-segment and the down-segment and at most one
peering link can be used as a shortcut. The extraneous
path segment can be omitted to achieve a shortcut relying
on the peering link. AS A1 has a peering link with BC
in Fig.4(a), thus AS A and AS B can communicate via a
peering shortcut path A→A1→BC→B1→B.
• Core-segment combination: The core AS on the up-
segment is different from that on the down-segment. For
example, a local ISD core-segment (J→I or J→H) is
enough for path A→D in Fig.4(a) as they are within
the same ISD. But an inter-ISD core-segment (H→K)
is required for path A→E in Fig.3 as they belong to
different ISDs.
2) DATA PLANE: PACKET CARRIED
FORWARDING STATE (PCFS)
As stated above, a control plane takes the charge of providing
an end-to-end path, while a data plane is applied to ensure that
a packet is indeed forwarded along the path that the control
plane offers. A SCION packet contains minimal information.
Source and destination are optional as the packet’s context is
unambiguous without addresses. The SCION router forwards
the packet to the next AS based on the AS-level path in the
packet header. During the forwarding, a border router verifies
if the packet is transmitted through a correct ingress interface
and then forwards it to the next hop through a correct egress
interface. Only when the packet reaches the destination AS,
will the router check the address of destination or packet
purpose to forward it to the final destination host.
3) TRUST MANAGEMENT
Traditional certificates, binding identifiers to public keys and
carrying digital signatures, are employed to authenticate all
entities. However, all parties are difficult to agree on a single
trust root in monopoly, while the compromise of a single
trusted certification enables forging a server certificate in
oligarchy. Therefore, the SCION aims to structure the trust
roots while supporting authentication policies.
To achieve flexible trust management, the SCIONproposes
to allow each ISD to define its own roots of trust and the
policy to dominate their usage. The details are presented
in [58].
The TRC is in charge of ISDs and defines the roots
of trust. A TRC file has a version number that is always
updated. Besides the number, it has a list of public keys
of trust roots for various purposes and governing policies.
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The TRC offers the ability to bootstrap the authentications,
achieve trust agility and trust revocation. A user can select
an ISD at its own will because the ISDs in the SCION
have links among themselves to cross-sign each other’s TRC
files. Efficient revocation of trust roots can be achieved by
following the distribution of PCBs to rapidly disseminate the
updated TRC with a new version number.
B. SECURITY IN SCION NETWORKS
To achieve high security, the SCION is equipped with cryp-
tographic mechanisms. First, the trust root of an ISD consists
of root key certificates of trusted ISD Core ASes and CAs,
and the TRC defines the governing policy, such as which root
key certificates are trusted. Second, each AS signs the PCB it
forwards, which can be verified by all entities. Furthermore,
the application of Packet Carried Forwarding State (PCFS)
can ensure the correctness of path. The border routers and
beacon servers share one secret key to compute and check
Message Authentication Code (MAC) over forwarding infor-
mation. What’s more, the per-AS information including the
ingress and egress interfaces, an expiration time and MAC is
encoded to be opaque to others, which can protect the privacy
of involved communication entities.
In the following subsections, some additional schemes
proposed by the SCION team are introduced.
1) SIBRA IN SCION: RESISTING DDoS ATTACKS
The SCION assumes that it has the full control and knowledge
of network paths, which lays the foundation of the selec-
tion of forwarding path. STRIDE [59] presented a refuge
from DDoS attacks based on the SCION, but its construction
relies on a non-congestion network, which is difficult to
be guaranteed in practice. Then a Scalable Internet Band-
width Reservation Architecture (SIBRA) [60] was designed
to accommodate the SCION architecture for overcom-
ing this problem. The SIBRA uses long-term contracts
amongst the Core ASes of large-scale ISDs to establish
core paths, intermediate-term contracts amongst ASes within
an ISD to establish steady paths, and short-term contracts
for end-to-end communications across ISDs to establish
ephemeral paths. SIBRA supports the bandwidth reserva-
tions and depends on an authenticated reservation token
to verify the availability of bandwidth to its neighbors.
It can further support statistical multiplexing and bandwidth
renewal of an ephemeral path according to a reservation
index.
The re-adjustment of bandwidth and the multiplexing
between traffic balance the traffic and enable the construc-
tion of dynamic inter-domain leased lines. It finally realizes
botnet-size independence to defend the DDoS attacks.
2) HORNET: ANONYMITY
Privacy of the Internet users worldwide is at risk and attracts
more and more attention. HORNET [61] as a highly-scalable
anonymity system was proposed to enhance the privacy with
efficiency and payload protection.
Each HORNET node inserts its state into a forward-
ing packet instead of keeping a per-session state, which
is called Forwarding Segment (FS). Then creating nodes
can dynamical retrieve the embedded information over an
offloading process. During a setup phase, all the FSes are
collected depending on a compact and provably secure mix
format named Sphinx [62]. In Data Distribution Phase, a
source first uses the FSes to construct a forward Anonymous
Header (AHDR) and a backward AHDR. The source onion-
encrypts its data payloads using shared symmetric session
keys, and prepends the AHDR. Each node retrieves its FS,
onion-decrypts the packet and forwards it to the next hop until
it reaches a destination. Finally, the destination can send the
data back to the source using the backward AHDR. Hence,
the source that provides the data or service is protected. The
anonymity of the source is guaranteed.
The further involvement of a public rendezvous point in the
scheme above can realize sender-receiver anonymity, which
is omitted for the reason of space limitation. Moreover, the
HORNET is not vulnerable to DoS attacks because all states
are carried within packets and no per-session memory needs
to be stored in nodes or rendezvous points.
3) SOURCE AUTHENTICATION AND PATH VALIDATION
Besides the efforts above, Kim et al. [63] tried to construct
higher-level security mechanisms from the perspective of
source authentication and path validation. SCION Control
Message Protocol (SCMP) is applied in the control plane.
In order to efficiently authenticate the SCMP, the SCION
gives up the use of digital signature for the possibility of
a processing bottleneck when creating lots of SCMP mes-
sages. Instead, Kim et al. [63] proposed to enable routers to
(re-)create symmetric keys shared with the end hosts on
the fly by applying Dynamically Recreatable Key (DRKey)
protocol.
In the above scheme, a session is initiated by source node S.
In key setup, S first selects a path to destination node D, gen-
erates an asymmetric key pair and creates a session identifier.
Simultaneously, it prepares some values for authentication
and validation. Then an Origin and Path Trace (OPT) packet
including these values is forwarded down to destination D.
And the router on the path uses it to set up shared symmetric
key and then adds some verification field into its header
for following verification. During verification, source S pre-
computes a special authentication field named PVF, which
enablesD to verify the path using collected path information.
The router recreates the shared key based on the PVF to
re-compute the verified field and compare it with the data
in the packet’s header. If the above check passes, it then
applies a MAC operation to update the PVF. Repeatedly until
it reaches destination D, D finally re-computes fields using
all the symmetric keys shared with other entities on the path.
The OPT is similar to the HORNET in dealing with
authentication. Both need the source to construct a field for
subsequent routing or authentication. Difference is that the
HORNET constructs a symmetric key using Diffie-Hellman
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key exchange but the OPT uses the DRKey to generate the
keys. They both can construct session keys between a desti-
nation and intermediate routers.
Through authenticating sources and validating paths, the
OPT can construct high-level security mechanisms such as
DDoS mitigation, path compliance and packet attribution.
This is because that the source authentication guarantees the
identity of source and the path validation eliminates the illegal
use of path by attackers.
VII. COMPARISON OF FUTURE INTERNET
ARCHITECTURES
We have presented five famous future Internet architectures
in details: NDN, COAST, MobilityFirst, XIA and SCION.
In this section, we present the pros and cons of each and
further compare them in terms of a number of security prop-
erties: anonymity, authenticity, integrity, privacy, DoS/DDoS
resistance, error/fault resilience, and evolvability.
A. PROS AND CONS
As stated above, the NDN and the COAST are content-centric
networks. One difference is that the NDN does not validate
Interest packets while the COAST verifies all packets. In the
NDN, upon receiving an Interest packet at a router, the router
will drop the packet or respond with a NACK message if the
upper link is down, otherwise it will record the packet in the
PIT if the number of PIT entries has not reached its threshold.
The cache in the NDN can help reducing workload as it for-
wards a Data packet to a data consumer as soon as an Interest
packet arrives. Naturally, the cache in the NDN also weakens
the effect of DDoS attacks through caching. However, it
is hard to detect potential attacks without the information
about data consumers. Luckily, enhanced security and more
functionality can be further offered in the NDN, as described
in the work [40], [41], [48], [49]. Some countermeasures
to the DDoS attacks were presented in [40] and [41] and
privacy problem was researched in [48] and [49]. Contrary
to the NDN, the COAST requires all packets including Inter-
est packets to be verified, which can enable the detection
of potential DDoS attacks. The COAST with the design of
multiple layers can be easily adapted to the current Internet
in its architecture and the intelligent nodes in the COAST help
filter and check traffic.
Besides the content-centric network architectures, the
MobilityFirst is designed to deal with the names and network
addresses to achieve mobility, which is actually a hybrid
name and address scheme. The MobilityFirst also adopts
opportunistic caching to achieve high performance on data
delivery.
Baid et al. [64] compared alternative architectures for
achieving functional goals of name oriented networking,
mainly the NDN and the MobilityFirst. Each router needs
to maintain a unique or an aggregated entry in its routing
table for each name. The routing table needs to scale to the
total number of named objects, which leads to specific issues
with scalability. The MobilityFirst tries to solve the problem
by decoupling the routing table from the content space size
and dividing the problem into two distinct parts: 1) mapping
by the GNRS; 2) routing protocol for distributing a rout-
ing table. Compared with the NDN, the MobilityFirst has a
smaller routing table size. In addition, it has a lower updating
overhead because the content changes would not affect the
network routing layer. But the changes would seriously affect
the name-based routing protocol.
Li et al. [65] further explored two architectures based on
the NDN and the MobilityFirst respectively to support Inter-
net of Things (IoT) and compared them through simulations.
The results show that the MobilityFirst has lower control
overheads with comparable performance in delay, throughput
and packet success rate.
In contrast to the three projects (NDN, COAST andMobil-
ityFirst), the XIA has the advantage of supporting diverse
entities, including content principals, service principals, net-
work principals and even unknown future principals. Another
outstanding feature is that it supports the fallback mechanism
to offer scalability and evolvability. Furthermore, the integra-
tion of the SCION with the XIA achieves a higher security
than the above three architectures, including accountability,
anonymity and availability. In order to maintain trust rela-
tionships, each entity should hold a secure identifier besides
the changeable and various XIDs. Otherwise, an adversary
can register into the network with a new identifier that may
eliminate its ever-bad records, which results in inaccurate
trust evaluation.
With greater efforts on security research, the SCION
presents more security properties than other four projects,
e.g., resisting DDoS attacks, anonymity, authentication, etc.
Trust management is mentioned in the NDN, the COAST, and
the MobilityFirst as a key technical challenge. But none of
them gives a concrete method to manage trust. The SCION
presents a detailed discussion on trust management. It adopts
the notions of ISDs and TRC to control trust efficiently,
which can dominate its own trust and limit the influence of
compromised trust root within its own ISD.
We summarize the high-level overall pros and cons of each
project in Table 1.
B. COMPARISON
By analyzing the five projects, we can find that eight security
properties are concerned: confidentiality, anonymity, authen-
ticity, integrity, privacy, DDoS resistance, evolvability and
(error and fault) resilience to the presence of adversaries.
In order to get a holistic knowledge of the security require-
ments and countermeasures, we further compare the five
projects from the eight security properties and summarize the
results in Table 2. Some security features are innate in the
network architecture design, while some are reinforced by
additional research efforts.
Data confidentiality is one vital component of data secu-
rity, which prevents unauthorized access to data. If end-
to-end communication can be built, confidentiality can
be easily guaranteed through cryptographic mechanisms
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TABLE 1. Pros and Cons of the five projects.
TABLE 2. Comparison of the five projects regarding security properties.
(e.g., symmetric encryption). As stated above, the XIA,
the MobilityFirst and the SCION can easily construct end-
to-end communications, while the NDN and the COAST
cannot. Moreover, the cached data in the NDN and the
COAST are available to all users, thus it is difficult to
deploy access control mechanism and achieve confidentiality.
Though HONS [52] and access control policy provide partial
confidentiality, confidentiality is still a crucial problem.
The HORNET [61] and the ANDaNA [46] were designed
to enhance the anonymity of the SCION and the NDN respec-
tively. TheMobilityFirst can achieve partial anonymity based
on dynamical binding. The COAST entity can also be anony-
mous using the HONS.
The HONS enables content-centric architectures (the NDN
and the COAST) to achieve data authentication. The signature
used in the NDN further provides non-repudiation in addition
to authentication. In addition, Yu et al. [66] designed a model
for the NDN to authenticate long-lived data in case of failure
caused by the short validity period of certification. The hash
of content or public key is used in the MobilityFirst and
the XIA to achieve both authentication and data integrity.
The SCION’s accountability can be enhanced by using the
OPT [63].
Privacy is a key problem nowadays. All these projects
have paid attention to it. Particularly, an attacker may be able
to infer privacy information by observing the speed of data
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responses in the NDN and the COAST, especially for highly
sensitive contents. Though such inference can be overcome
in a certain degree by delaying data delivery, it causes
some impact on network performance. Privacy protection
in the XIA can be achieved by choosing different XIDs
for different purposes, which somewhat can prevent track-
ing but may not be sufficient in many applications. The
dynamic bindings of names and network addresses in the
MobilityFirst and the HORNET can achieve higher privacy
protection.
The data centric nature of the NDN makes it vulnerable to
some special DDoS attacks, such as Interest flooding and con-
tent poisoning, hence some countermeasures [40], [41] were
proposed. The content filtering and qualification process in
the COAST are able to mitigate DDoS attacks but no detailed
discussions were given in the literature. Intrinsic security in
the MobilityFirst and the XIA allows the network to validate
the sources of contents that is certainly useful to mitigate
DDoS attacks. The NetFence [56] for the MobilityFirst and
the SIBRA [60] for the SCION were designed to resist DDoS
attacks.
The incremental deployment of intelligent services and
virtual overlays in the COAST make it evolvable. The com-
puting and storage layer in the MobilityFirst and the intro-
duction of new principals in the XIA can both support
evolvability.
The packet retransmission supported by caching ensures
the resilience of the NDN in a passive way. The COAST
obtains a good resilience to node failures at the cost of
overhead to have good knowledge of network segments.
Trustworthiness and verifiable identifier in the MobilityFirst
reinforce the network resilience in the presence of certain
malicious adversaries: Multi-path communications in the
SCION make it fault and attack resilient.
The above comparisons are based on the design documents
and silent features of the five future Internet architectures,
which are not sufficient to conclude which architectures are
superior. This is true since all the projects are at an early
stage and lack sufficiently large scale testing and deployment.
However, our comparisons indeed provide a high level under-
standing of theses architectures. Based on these comparisons,
we present a number of important security issues that need to
be addressed in future research in the next section.
VIII. DISCUSSIONS AND PERSPECTIVES
Having presented an overview and comparison of the five
future Internet architectures, we further give a perspective of
the security problems and some potential countermeasures.
We also provide a list of security issues worth further study
in the future.
A. SECURITY ISSUES
From the discussions above, we can see that several security
issues have been taken into consideration by all projects and
should be embedded in the network designs towards building
a holistic future Internet architecture:
1) DATA CONFIDENTIALITY
Data over the network are easily accessed by adversaries and
unauthorized consumers. Confidentiality should be guaran-
teed to prevent eavesdropping.
Confidentiality can be achieved through cryptography
(e.g., symmetric encryption, asymmetric encryption, PRE).
Besides the traditional mechanism, q-RPB scheme intro-
duced in HONS and access control policy (e.g., publish/
subscribe scheme) are two other ways to achieve the data
confidentiality, especially for content-centric networks.
2) DATA INTEGRITY
Data are transmitted through the network and exposed to
many adversaries. They are subjected to injection and manip-
ulation during transmission. In order to obtain the correct
and complete data, the integrity of data is one of the most
important issues for content-centric networks.
Towards this goal, two main approaches have been pro-
posed. One is the digital signature used in the NDN. Each data
packet is signed to support integrity check. Another approach
is to apply the hash value of content as self-certifying iden-
tifier in the MobilityFirst and the XIA, which results in the
same effect but could be more efficient.
3) AUTHENTICITY
To resist impersonation attacks, authentication has been con-
sidered in all these projects using the same techniques as data
integrity. In addition, routers in the OPT [63] compute and
update the authentication field in a packet one by one, which
enables the destination to authenticate the source and even the
routing path.
4) DoS/DDoS RESISTANCE
Though routers and other intelligent networking devices
in the future Internet are much more powerful than their
counterparts in today’s Internet, they are still vulnerable to
DoS/DDoS attacks, which can trigger a massive number of
compromised machines or zombies to exhaust vast but still
limited resources. Resistance to the DoS/DDoS attacks has
been a priority in all the five projects.
Three approaches have been proposed in the five projects
to mitigate the DoS/DDoS attacks. Caching is one of the
simplest approaches, which can circumvent the redistribution
of the same content requests and save bandwidth, though
it brings some negative effects (for example, privacy issue)
that need to be addressed [67]–[69]. Intrinsic security also
contributes positively towards mitigation of the DoS/DDoS
attacks since it ensures the transmission of legal traffic. Per-
haps the most effective approach is bandwidth management
during routing path establishment such as the SIBRA [60]
and the congestion policing feedback as proposed in the
NetFence [56]. They both cope with the DoS/DDoS problem
from the perspective of guaranteed bandwidth. That is, they
guarantee the successful delivery of legitimate requests and
data by reserving the bandwidth for authorized users ahead
of time.
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5) SENDER/RECEIVER ANONYMITY
In some sensitive scenarios, it is necessary to conceal the
addresses of destinations and sources. Today’s Internet offers
weak privacy protection. One can find out who are the sender
and the recipient by checking the source and destination
addresses. Obviously, separation of identifiers and addresses
is the most efficient way for enhancing sender/receiver
anonymity. Content-centric networks even do not involve the
addresses of the source and destination and just specify data
names. TheMobilityFirst separates the human readable name
from the network address and dynamically binds them for
communications. The HORNET [61] achieves this goal with
anonymous header and onion-encryption, which provides
stronger anonymity but with the cost of higher overhead due
to the additional encryption and decryption operations.
6) USER PRIVACY
With the pervasiveness of communications, data mining and
cloud computing, user privacy becomes increasingly a serious
concern, which even influences the user acceptance of many
networking services. Except for anonymity, anti-inference is
another crucial issue with regard to user privacy. Since con-
tent caching is used in all of the five projects, network neigh-
bors may learn about each other’s content accesses using
timing information to identify cache hits. A method proposed
in the NDN to address this problem is to introduce delays
in data delivery. But this solution could impact networking
performance.
7) RESILIENCE
In terms of resilience to network errors/faults and malicious
attacks, the passive way of retransmission after failure is
one effective method. Besides, domain isolation based on
trustworthiness in the SCION would be a good solution to
confine the damage of attacks to a single domain.
8) EVOLVABILITY
From the lessons of today’s Internet, evolvability must be
supported in the design of the future Internet. It is impossible
to forecast what will come in the future and encapsulate all
of them into the design now. Evolvability can satisfy the
requirements and guarantee its continuous suitability.
The COAST supports evolvability through deployment of
intelligent services, a new layer or principal can be adopted
to solve this issue. The XIA supports evolvability by accom-
modating multiple principal types, including unknown types
in the future.
B. FUTURE SECURITY RESEARCH ISSUES
All of the five future Internet projects put security as high
priority in their designs. However, all the projects, except
the SCION, only provided a very coarse description on the
core security techniques and the desirable security features
without in-depth investigation, thus left many open issues.
The following is a list of open security issues that we believe
are important for achieving the security goals of the future
Internet and hence need to be studied carefully in the future.
1) ACCESS CONTROL
Traditional countermeasures are not very suitable for ICN due
to the absence of hosts and the adoption of caching. Hence, a
flexible and practical access control mechanism is needed to
realize data confidentiality.
- How to control the access to data cached widely at
routers? Attribute-Based Encryption (ABE) [70], [71]
can be potentially applied to solve this problem. The
control policies can be regarded as attributes to protect
data.
- Trust can be introduced to judge access. It can be used
to evaluate data consumers or routers, and thus impel
involved routers to behave honestly. The combination of
trust and ABE would be another direction, such as the
work described in [72].
2) EFFICIENT SIGNATURES
Signature plays a vital role in all five future Internet architec-
tures. All Data packets in the NDN are signed and ASes in the
SCION signs all routing requests (e.g., PCBs). Hence, they all
call for a more efficient signature algorithm than normal ones
to adapt to newly designed network.
- To realize high speed networking, signature generation
and verification must be extremely efficient. There is
also an urgent need to study and standardize efficient
post-quantum computer digital signature schemes.
3) DATA ORGANIZATION AND NAME MANAGEMENT
Due to the lack of host in the NDN and the COAST, names are
widely used to represent the content and work as IP address.
The NDN router needs to cache data entries. In the COAST,
the binding relationship between contents and names should
be stored. In the XIA, names are derived from hashing data.
However, the following issues need to be systematically
studied:
- How to name data with complicated structures
(e.g., scalable multimedia data)?
- How to deal with bit errors and packet losses while
allowing verifiability if the name is derived from hashing
of the data? Some studies [73]–[76] have been done
in multimedia authentication, which may offer some
guidelines to solve this problem.
- How to name data generated in real-time?
- Routers or network intelligent devices hold large rout-
ing tables for named objects. How to organize them to
achieve fast delivery while resisting DDoS attacks?
4) AVAILABILITY AND DDoS RESISTANCE
Today’s Internet supports many critical applications that
underpin the foundations of our modern society. However,
the current state of availability of the Internet is far from
being commensurate given its importance. Numerous efforts
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are required to study availability issues in the future Inter-
net, and in particular, techniques to detect and mitigate
DDoS attacks.
- How to detect and prevent attacks by legitimate entities
that are able to produce verifiable network requests and
data?
- How to detect and prevent cache poisoning attacks in
content-centric networks?
5) SCALABLE AND FLEXIBLE TRUST MANAGEMENT
The paradigms of monopoly and oligarchy in trust manage-
ment have their own pros and cons. Entities widely distributed
are difficult to agree on one trust root. The SCION proposed
to depend on isolation domains to manage trust roots. But
how to formulate trust criteria and evaluate trust is also an
open problem. The other projects, i.e., NDN, MobilityFirst,
COAST and XIA, simply assume the existence of a scalable
and flexible trust management structure without providing
any detailed discussions. A number of additional issues as
listed below should be seriously studied before deploying the
proposed architecture in practice.
- How to agree on roots of trust and maintain their
resilience at the Internet scale?
- How to manage, store, and revoke certificates for bil-
lions of devices, including end user devices, network
nodes and services? The XIA and the MobilityFirst are
designed for intrinsic security. That is, network entities
can validate integrity and authenticity without check-
ing with external databases (i.e., a certificate revocation
database). Then how to verify that a certificate or iden-
tity has not been revoked?
- Network identifiers derived from the hash of public
keys are not hierarchical. Similarly, data names derived
from the hash of data content are not hierarchical. Yet
hierarchical names and identifiers are essential for effi-
cient routing. A possible approach to solve the problem
is exploring hierarchical identity-based encryption and
signature schemes that allows distributed key generation
and management. Again, key revocation is an extremely
challenging issue.
6) TRADEOFF ON MOBILITY AND SCALABILITY
In the MobilityFirst, core-edge routing supports a two-level
hierarchy. A core router and an edge router hold different
forwarding entries, which can reduce the number of for-
warding table entries stored in the routers. But it limits the
mobility. Other projects provide certain supports on mobil-
ity by rebinding or re-transmission, but how to arrive at
a fair tradeoff on scalability and mobility is still an open
issue.
7) A UNIFIED AND HOLISTIC SECURITY ARCHITECTURE
Every project has its own pros and cons and focuses on differ-
ent aspects of security. It is a crucial task to construct a unified
and holistic security architecture for the future Internet.
IX. CONCLUSION
The Internet was designed some 40 years ago and has been
successful beyond even the most optimistic expectations.
However, it is facing many challenges, including scalability,
mobility, availability and security. The diverse services espe-
cially economic activities and the dominant use of the Internet
as distributed networks call for a clean slate design of new
Internet architecture, which embeds security as an intrinsic
feature. So far, many research efforts have been carried out
all over the world on the research of the Future Internet.
In this survey, we looked at five of these projects: NDN,
COAST, MobilityFirst, XIA and SCION. We presented their
motivations and architecture designs, analyzed their security
goals and techniques and provided a comparison of the five
architectures. Finally, we mentioned the main security issues
that must be kept in mind during the Internet architecture
design and proposed a number of open issues for future
research.
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